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ARGUMENT
I.
FWC ARGUES FACTUAL MATTERS THAT ARE EITHER NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD OR THAT ONLY POINT OUT THE FACTUAL
DISPUTES IMPROPERLY RESOLVED ON ITS 12(b)(6) MOTION.
Geothermal's opening brief invited discussion of the standards and analysis of a 12(b)(6)
motion, both at the trial level and on appeal. The invitation was declined, mostly. FWC does
contend that neither the trial court nor this Court should invent facts sufficient to save an
otherwise defective complaint. Geothermal, of course, does not contend otherwise. Invention is
not required, but an assessment of what has been pled and what might be pled - "any set of
facts" - is required. Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 1360 (Utah App. 1991).
Rule 12(b)(6) jurisprudence dictates and reason suggests that the earlier a claim is
dismissed the more exacting is the standard that must be overcome to achieve dismissal and to
protect that result on appeal. The opinions of this court and the Supreme Court routinely begin
with a statement of the standard of review, and for a good reason. The standards are issuedriven. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).
The rules of the analysis are categorical: there must be "certainty" that the plaintiff
cannot recover under any facts that could be pled to support the claim. Arrow Indus, v. Zions
First Nat Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1998). That is muscular language. It is a standard
unchanged since Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957): dismissal is improper "unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim . . . ."(emphasis
added).

1

It seems, however, that courts seem to still grapple with the tension between rule 12(b)(6)
and rule 8(a). Rule 12(b)(6) "is the successor of the common law demurrer and the code motion
to dismiss

" 5A FEDERAL

PRACTICE

&

PROCEDURE

§ 1349, at 190-91 (2d ed. 1990). Yet,

rule 8(a), however, took the pleading process out of the rigid code pleading requirements. In
Blackham v. Snelgrove, 280 P.2d 453, 455 (1955) the following was observed:
Thus, it can very often be found stated in these cases that a complaint is required only to
give the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general
indication of the type of litigation involved.
In Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963), decided in the context of pleading
affirmative defenses, the Court noted this about the real meaning behind notice pleading:
[The rules] must all be looked to in the light of their even more fundamental purpose of
liberalizing both pleading and procedure to the end that the parties are afforded the privilege of
presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute. What they are
entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet them. When this is
accomplished, that is all that is required. Our rules provide for liberality to allow examination
into and settlement of all issues bearing upon the other party safeguard the rights of the other
party to have a reasonable time to meet a new issue if he so requests, (emphasis added). *
FWC avoids serious discussion of these rules. It instead argues the merits, invoking a
factual analysis to support dismissal. Except for the purpose of culling inferences, a factual
analysis has no place in a 12(b)(6) motion. The test is not whether the claims are any good, or
whether the complaint is a model of clarity, but only "whether the petitioner has alleged enough
in the complaint to state a cause of action." Alvarez v. Galetka, 933 P.2d 987, 989 (Utah 1997).

1

That passage was quoted with approval in Eie v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 1193-94
(1981) (answer referring generally to fraudulent inducement, estoppel and breach by plaintiffs was
sufficient pleading to raise the issue that parties' agreement was not integrated and was therefore subject
to modification by contemporaneous oral communications).
2

Under a notice pleading regime, the bar is set quite low. Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling
Platter, Inc., 930 P.2d 268, 275 (Utah App. 1996).
To affirm in this case is to announce a qualitatively higher standard of pleading and to
remove established limitations on the trial bench when analyzing a 12(b)(6) motion. Issues of
integration, ambiguity and reasonableness would be fair game at a stage far earlier in the trial
court than has ever been allowed or that was contemplated when rule 8 was adopted. Deciding
such issues—especially reasonableness—on summary judgment is fraught with difficulty. It is
even more dangerous on the scant record available on a 12(b)(6) motion.
Both below and on appeal, FWC argued disputedfacts to support dismissal.
FWC adopts a unique approach to protecting its 12(b)(6) dismissal on appeal. Whenever
needed, facts, unsupported by any record citation, are inserted into the mix to support FWCs
position—to in effect explain its thinking during the contract negotiations. That approach started
in the trial court. FWC argued below that the agreement to reimburse the closing costs would
not have made sense because "the operating statement states implicitly that [Geothermal doesn't]
have any operating history . . . . " (Tr. 27)(emphasis added).
FWC complained below also that Geothermal did not have "any significant assets or
sources of funds." Id. An "operating statement," whatever that is, was not part of the record.
And what it states "implicitly" seems a strange way to support a 12(b)(6) motion. These were
factual matters not even mentioned in the complaint, a fact that by itself renders them
meaningless under a 12(b)(6) analysis.

3

FWC approaches this appeal the same way. Its statement of facts does not state facts so
much as argue them. FWC begins its statement of facts by announcing that it was the "owner of
a new, valuable, but temporarily cash-strapped geothermai energy plant. . . ." (FWC brief at 5).
The only one of those facts supported by the record is that FWC was an owner (R. 16:004).
According to FWC, the agreement with Geothermai
bristles with express provisions reflecting FWC's lack of certainty about [Geothermars]
ability to raise cash at all—let alone on favorable terms—and FWC's consequent need for the
ability to terminate the transaction if the terms ultimately presented were unfavorable.
(FWC brief at 6).
This argument raises two interesting points. First, if this argument is directed at the
overall transaction—the purchase of the 50% operating interest in the geothermai plants—then it
is wasted effort. No plausible reading of paragraph 7 or any other provision of the agreement
supports the notion that FWC could cancel because it was concerned about the overall financing.
The only contingency was the anticipated loan, which started out at $ 1 million and ended up at
$300,000. (R. 018-19; 029).
Second, because a loan was contemplated, the parties would have had to negotiate
regarding security, interest rate, repayment terms, and other terms normally part of a loan. Such
terms were initially spelled out in the August 10 agreement. (R.019). The parties must have
anticipated different terms after the amount was reduced to $300,000 because the February 3
modification says that the loan terms were "yet to be created." (R.031).
This leads to another factual dispute created by FWC. It argued that it cancelled because
of dissatisfaction with the loan terms (leaving aside for the moment whether it actually had any

4

loan terms to review). (R. 25). FWC seems now undecided about why it cancelled. It mentions
on appeal that its geothermal plant was "temporarily cash-strapped," (FWC brief at 5), and that
as negotiations continued, its plants "had survived without the quick infusion of cash" and that
they were "more profitable and, hence, more valuable than it was thought to be . . . . " Id. at 15.
Recall that the complaint alleges that FWC cancelled, not because of some loan that was,
according to FWC now, no longer needed, but because its price had gone up thanks to improved
conditions at the plants. (R. 009). But cancellation for this reason—that FWC could do better—
was not permitted, at least if FWC s argument that the agreement is unambiguous in this regard
is accepted.
FWC's central theme on appeal is that it had an unqualified right to cancel if the loan was
either not funded or was otherwise unacceptable. The loan was, according to FWC, "the linchpin
of the entire transaction . . . ." (FWC brief at 15 and passim). There was, therefore, a factual
dispute about just why FWC cancelled. FWC states at least twice in its brief that it cancelled the
agreement "pursuant to its express terms." (FWC brief at 26, 27). Cancellation was limited
expressly to the loan terms and nothing else, and certainly not the possibility that FWC might
change its mind because its energy plants were performing better than expected.
II.
FWC MISAPPLIES THE LAW CONCERNING THE IMPLIED TERM OF
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING.
FWC argues for an exception to the implied good faith term inherent in this and every
other contract. FWC contends that its right to cancel is unfettered by a good faith obligation

5

because the right is spelled out in the agreement and is therefore a risk "expressly assumed" by
Geothermal. (FWC brief at 24).
This argument is merely a variation on an already rejected theme. If adopted, it would
negate entirely the long-standing good faith obligation. In Olympus Hills Shopping Or. v.
Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., 889 P.2d 445 (Utah App. 1994), cert denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah
1995), the issue was "whether parties who retain express power or discretion under a contract
can exercise that power or discretion in such a way as to breach the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing." Id. at 450. This Court said they can: "Our courts have determined that a party
must exercise express rights awarded under a contract reasonably and in good faith."

Id.

(citations omitted).
Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah
1985) is indistinguishable on a reasoned analysis. There, the operative agreement contained the
following:
It is agreed and understood by the parties that THE COMPANY may, at any time, in its
sole discretion, terminate this Agreement in the event it determines there is not sufficient
promise of minerals of commercial value on the subject properties covered by the Agreement,
sufficient to justify the further expenditures of time or money by THE COMPANY.
Id at 1034.
The broad right provided by this language was subject to the obligation of good faith and
fair dealing. Id. at 1038 Conditions to cancellation come with an obligation to evaluate those
conditions in good faith. Otherwise, as FWC argues, the inherent term of good faith is easily
sidestepped by merely spelling out the cancellation right in the agreement. "Even if the promisor
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is himself to be the judge of the cause or condition, he must use good faith and an honest
judgment." Resource Management, 706 P.2d at 1038, quoting Corbin on Contracts § 165, at 8687(1963).2
Resource Management relied in part on Richard Bruce & Co. v. J. Simpson & Co., 243
N.Y.S.2d 503 (1963). There, a party had the right to terminate at any time if prior to a date
certain the party "in its absolute discretion[] shall determine that market conditions or the
prospects of the public offering are such as to make it undesirable or inadvisable to make or
continue the public offering [under the agreement]." Resource Management, 706 P.2d at 1037.
Even language this broad was limited by the obligation of good faith and fair dealing. Id.
Parties to an agreement should not be held to FWC's proposed rule - that a party assumes by
such language the risk that express conditions can be ignored.
Here, cancellation was conditioned expressly on the acceptability of loan terms that
everyone agreed would be presented in loan documents "yet to be created." (R. 59). As for the
"business terms and conditions associated with the loan," no such terms and conditions could
exist until the loan was actually proposed. Only then could FWC determine whether such terms
and conditions were "unfavorable." (R. 59).3

2

Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982) says the same thing. There, despite
complete discretion, a corporation acted in bad faith when it refused to approve certain business partners
without considering their merits.
3
The risk argument urged by FWC is the crux of the holding in Olympus Hills. This Court observed as
follows:
Thus, in this case, our inquiry does not end with the recognition that Smith's had the
discretionary power or contractual authority to operate "any lawful retail selling business." The
question is whether, upon a motion for summary judgment or directed verdict, the trial court
properly found that reasonable minds could differ as to whether Smith's wrongfully exercised
7

FWC attempts to negate the conditions expressed in paragraph 7 by proposing an entirely
new one: that nothing was binding until the loan proceeds were actually received. (FWC brief at
23). That argument begs the initial question, as no loan proceeds could be received until the loan
terms were presented, evaluated, even negotiated, and then agreed on. Indeed, FWC's chief
contention is that it had the absolute right to evaluate those terms. Plainly it could not pocket the
loan proceeds first and then decide whether to actually borrow them.4
The good faith and fair dealing obligation "is not susceptible to brightline definitions and
tests." Olympus Hills, 809 P.2d at 450 n.6, (citation omitted). Conceptually, then, it seems that,
short of some fact as "brightline" as a statute of limitations, resolving a fact-driven issue like
good faith and fair dealing is extremely difficult at the pleading stage. The ultimate test of good
faith, after all, is "reasonableness." Id. at 451-52 and n.7.

III. GEOTHERMAL HAS NOT ATTEMPTED TO REWRITE THE
AGREEMENT, BUT INSTEAD TO ENFORCE IT ACCORDING TO ITS
TERMS.
FWC argues that Geothermal's position is an attempt to retrofit the agreement with terms
more beneficial than originally agreed. (FWC brief at 24). Geothermal argues nothing of the
kind. Indeed, it is FWC that now seeks a better agreement than the one it made. Its position is

this power for a reason beyond the risks that Olympus Hills assumed in its lease with Smith's or
for a reason inconsistent with Olympus Hills's "justified expectations." See St. Benedict's, 811
P.2d at 200; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 cmt. a (1981).
Olympus Hills, 889 P.2d at 451.
Even where the contract is not complete - as in an agreement to agree - the parties are bound by the
implied term of good faith and fair dealing: "There is no reason why an enforceable agreement to agree
does not give rise to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Brown s Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch, 955 P.2d
357, 366 (Utah App. 1998).

4

8

that it could cancel preemptively, before it even reviewed the loan terms in documents that did
not exist. That must be its position because no loan documents were ever created and no loan
was proposed and yet FWC claims to have cancelled because of dissatisfaction with the loan.
FWC contends that Geothermal asks this court to "read into the contract a right for
[Geothermal] to make the unilateral determination to substitute a cash payment for the Loan . . .
"

(FWC brief at 24-25).

accommodation,

That is not Geothermal's position.

[Geothermal]

agreed

to

reimburse" FWC

The fact is, "as a further
up

to

$300,000.

(R.

16:008)(emphasis added). It is no coincidence, of course, that this amount is the same as the
loan amount in the agreement. (R. 16:031). "[L]egal and associated closing costs" were FWC's
concern as the closing approached. (R. 16:008). These allegations do not suggest a "unilateral
determination" by Geothermal; they suggest a negotiated agreement.
FWC contends further that Geothermal attempts to "bypass the process set out in the Lol
which gave FWC rights to negotiate and be satisfied with the terms of the ultimate transaction
and, absent such satisfaction, to walk away." (FWC brief at 25). No plausible reading of the
agreement, and particularly paragraph 7 of the February 3 version (R. 16:031), supports such a
right. FWC suggests with that language that it could cancel because it was not satisfied with the
"ultimate transaction . . . ." Paragraph 7, however, plainly limits cancellation based on an
assessment of the loan terms only.
In terms of enforceability, Geothermal is accused of arguing "several straw men," but
with citation to only one. (FWC brief at 18, n.5). Geothermal does not argue the position FWC
ascribes to it. That portion of Geothermal's brief, properly understood, addresses integration.

9

Paragraph 7's integration language is anything but aggressive. It says that there will be at least
one more agreement - the loan - and that other modifications require board approval.
The factual question of integration alone casts severe doubt on the trial court's ruling.
There is no straw man lurking in the argument that integration - an implicit finding in the ruling
below - is a factual question resolved improperly on a 12(b)(6) motion.

IV. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE OF THE
IMMATERIAL MODIFICATION TO THE AGREEMENT.
FWC contends incorrectly that Geothermal seeks to impose a unilateral "substitute
performance." (FWC brief at 25). There was indeed a substitute, but it was not unilateral. The
claim is that, to "accommodat[e]" FWC, Geothermal "agreed" to pay a cash reimbursement
instead of lending the $300,000.

(R. 008).

Why Geothermal would unilaterally alter the

agreement to its own detriment—giving up the right to have its $300,000 repaid—is never
explained.
Plainly, the reasonable inference never drawn by the trial court is that Geothermal
"agreed" to this term because that's what FWC wanted. That this was an agreed term is the
whole point. And this modification to the agreement offends neither the agreement nor the
statute of frauds because the "agreed' change—reimbursement instead of a loan—is immaterial.
Money—the same amount—was still changing hands; the only modification was whether it had
to be paid back.
FWC contends that "[i]t cannot seriously be argued that the loan was immaterial to the
transaction."

(FWC brief at 21).

Fortunately for the serious-minded no one argues that.
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Materiality depends on the circumstances. FWC contends that circumstances changed, such that
its plants no longer needed that "quick infusion of cash...." (FWC brief at 15). The amount of
money to change hands never changed after the February 3 agreement - it was still $300,000.
FWC was still getting these funds, but without having to borrow them. Does FWC seriously
contend that, for the deal to close, it must borrow, and therefore repay, the money rather than
accept free reimbursement?
If the statute of frauds were to play a role in this issue, it would surely cut the other way.
That is, had Geothermal claimed the reverse of what actually happened—that a cash
reimbursement was modified to be a loan instead—thus requiring repayment where no such
obligation had existed before, then applying the statute of frauds would at least make sense. It
would make sense for FWC to argue the statute to preserve the better deal. Here, the party to
whose detriment the modification was intended is trying to enforce that modification. FWC
needs no protection behind the statute of frauds.
V,
GEOTHERMAL PLED SUFFICIENT FACTS AND THE ELEMENTS OF
ITS CLAIMS TO SURVIVE A 12(b)(6) MOTION.
Ultimately, conflicting interpretations of contract terms and indecision about the basis for
canceling do not drive the 12(b)(6) analysis. What does drive it is the uncomplicated question of
whether enough facts have been pled to support the claims. Mackay v. Cannon, 996 P.2d 1081
(Utah App. 2000).
Geothermal pled two versions of breach of contract—one written and one oral.
Paragraphs 25 through 33 of the complaint (R. 009-010) allege contracts, breach and damages.
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Geothermal alleges its own performance. (R. 007). Geothermal pled the critical fact that FWC
cancelled because it wanted more money because its plants were performing better.

The

agreement allows cancellation only in connection with the loan. For background allegations, the
complaint is prolix. The same is true for the quantum meruit claim. Facts sufficient to show a
benefit and its appreciation have been pled. (R. 012-013). See Olson, 815 P.2d at 1360 (1991)
(elements of contract implied in law branch of quantum meruit).
Having pled a factual basis for its claims, Geothermal did enough to survive a 12(b)(6)
motion because it complied with rule 8(a).

The trial court erred by going beyond those

allegations and construing the agreement, including necessarily factual issues of integration,
ambiguity and good faith cancellation. Such claims are typically not resolved, or resolvable, as a
matter of law. See, e.g., Cook v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 919 P.2d 56, 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)
("whether there has been a breach of good faith and fair dealing is a factual issue, generally
inappropriate for decision as a matter of law"); Olympus Hills, 889 P.2d at 458 ("Whether a party
has materially breached a [contract] is generally a question of fact for the fact finder.").^
"The days of strict adherence to draconian formalities at the pleading stage are over."
Consolidated Realty Group, 930 P.2d at 275. The pleadings are restricted to general noticegiving. Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 970-71 (Utah 1982). If these statement

5

As surprising as dismissal of these claims is, it is just as surprising that the trial court did not allow
leave to amend. "[Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) generally is not final or on the merits and the court
normally will give plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint.... Amendment should be refused only if
it appears to a certainty that plaintiff cannot state a claim." Alvarez, 933 P.2d at 991 (citations omitted).
Geothermal's current counsel likely would have prepared the complaint differently, but prior counsel
should have at least been afforded the opportunity of amending.
12

mean what they say, then at the pleading stage a trial court errs when, as happened here, it
construes an agreement or decides issues of integration and good faith.
CONCLUSION
Disputed factual issues—integration and good faith conduct, to name just two—had to be
resolved before the trial court could rule as it did. On a 12(b)(6) motion that is reversible error.
There is no room to be wrong, as every doubt is resolved and every reasonable inference drawn
in plaintiffs favor. Even now, FWC's position is inconsistent as it tries to decide just why it
cancelled the agreement. This case was not ripe for summary judgment, let alone dismissal on
the complaint. This Court should, therefore, reverse.
DATED this ( 9

ctay of December, 2000
Respectfully submitted,
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C.

DAVID C. WRIGHT (55/56)
Attorneys for The Geotkermal Company
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